Introduction
e LOSC, as the Spanish delegate to UNCLOS III noted, was anticipated to be a unified regime protecting and serving two intricately related sets of rights and obligations -those of the individual coastal and flag states, and those of the international community, both divisibly and as a whole.
 Nowhere is this delicate balance more evident, more important, and yet more ambiguous than the what-where-who-how as it relates to innocent passage and the international community's authority to use force in the Territorial Sea. With respect to UN naval peace operations, the inherently exceptional nature of the interface between the international community and the Territorial Sea is, however, further complicated by the imported legitimation implications of the UN Charter and Chapter VII. In the Territorial Sea, as with UN peace operations on land, application of the general Article () and () prohibitions on the threat or use of force, and interference in the domestic affairs of states, must be interpreted with reference to the UNSC's international peace and secu- rity competence. us third party rights of innocent passage through the Territorial Sea must account for and respond to the necessities of UN naval peace operations. Similarly, the fact of coastal state sovereignty over the Territorial Sea is thus subject to both inherent caveats in favour of the international community generally (such as innocent passage), and imported caveats in favour of international peace and security in particular (such as Chapter VII of the UN Charter). e next four chapters of this book will examine the construction of authority in respect of the types of operational conduct that planners and executors of UN naval peace operations must take into account. e use of force in the territory of another state is the most categorically and prudentially significant act which a state or the international community collectively can contemplate. e interaction between power and legitimation, and the consequent authority context this generates, is to a large degree dependant on whether and how this interaction is cognisant of those issues that are of particular importance to UN naval peace operations in the Territorial Sea. is chapter will therefore examine the problematic issue of innocent passage and use of force generally. Chapter five will analyse a practical example of how a basis of authority can be constructed in support of UN naval peace operations in the Territorial Sea of a non-consenting state -the enforcement of UNSC sanctions regimes. Chapter six will broaden this scope by examining the practice of constructing a similar basis of authority in Territorial Seas within which sovereignty is unclear. Chapter seven, using the doctrine of unit self-defence as a comparative point and a source of principles, will then propose a means of constructing the necessary authority to enable UN naval peace operations in the Territorial Seas of non-directly involved, and non-consenting (third party) states. e aim in this chapter, therefore, is to describe and analyse a basis of general authority for UN naval peace operations in the Territorial Sea, through examining the relationship between innocent passage, use of force, and UN naval peace operations. e chapter will begin with a brief overview of the nature of the Territorial Sea. It will then examine the concept of innocent passage, and describe its implications for UN naval peace operations in the Territorial Sea. Finally, the chapter will conclude with an analysis, in general terms, of the issue of international community uses of force in the Territorial Sea during UN naval peace operations, outlining the purposes, triggering acts, and permissible levels which attach to force in the Territorial Sea.
e Nature of the Territorial Sea e Territorial Sea regime described in Part II of the LOSC details the width, delimitation, and rights and obligations of states within this most sensitive of ocean zones. e fundamental aspects of this regime (such as the  nautical mile width of the Territorial Sea, and Article  on innocent passage) were settled relatively early in the UNCLOS III process -as early as  in most cases. Further, these provisions changed little over the subsequent course of negotiations, despite several attempts -even as late as  -to put aspects of the regime back on the agenda.  e result- In , for example, Argentina, China, Ecuador, Madagascar, Peru, and e Philippines proposed an amendment aimed at introducing a regime of prior notification for war-
